A new round of trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) was launched in 2001. One of the major aims of the Doha Development Round is to reduce agricultural protection and impose greater discipline on domestic agricultural subsidies, particularly those that are the most trade distorting. In this paper we examine whether the proposed WTO modalities for agriculture will actually achieve this aim in Norway, which ranks among the top providers of government assistance for agriculture. Norway has a complex system of farm subsidies buttressed by substantial import protection. The extent to which its agricultural support policies will have to be changed in response to new WTO disciplines provides an important indication of how successful these are likely to be. We find that Norway will probably be able to sustain its current agricultural activity and production levels while staying within the new WTO rules. Following recent practice in some other WTO members, Norway will be able to reduce its notified support without making real changes in some of its programs. However, there will have to be a shift from market price support, which is paid for by consumers through higher food prices, to budgetary support paid by taxpayers and that could generate internal pressures for policy reform.
Introduction
A new round of trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) was launched in 2001. One of the major aims of the Doha Development Round is to reduce agricultural protection and impose greater discipline on domestic agricultural subsidies, particularly those that are most trade distorting. In this paper we examine whether the proposed WTO modalities for agriculture will actually achieve this aim in the case of Norway. Norwegian agriculture, which accounts for less than one percent of GDP and three percent of domestic employment, is among the most heavily protected in the world (NILF 2007) . The OECD's Producer Support Estimate (PSE) for Norway was 65 percent in 2006, surpassed only by Iceland's 66 percent (OECD 2007) . Norway has a complex system of farm subsidies involving deficiency payments, structural income support, acreage and headage payments, and a range of indirect supports. The system is buttressed by substantial import protection, which limits market access. Consequently, the extent to which Norway will have to change its agricultural support policies in response to new WTO disciplines provides an important indicator of how successful these are likely to be.
Current and proposed WTO rules for agriculture
One of the major achievements of the Uruguay Round (UR) of negotiations (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) was an agreement on agriculture. Since the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, agriculture had largely been left out of multilateral trade negotiations.
There had been little reduction in the protection provided through tariff and non-tariff trade barriers and support through domestic subsidies (Normile and Simone 2001) .
The UR Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) made modest progress in this regard, resulting in the conversion of non-tariff barriers to bound tariffs with some moderate reductions. The AoA introduced limitations on the value of export subsidies and the volume of subsidized exports, and a cap on the value of the most trade-distorting domestic subsidies, again with a modest reduction in that cap. There were also several other innovations, including: a construct called tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) intended to provide a minimal level of market access for imports that would otherwise face prohibitive tariffs; the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) that defines how tradedistorting subsidies are to be measured and how the value of support is to be quantified; and the classification of two categories of subsidy (blue box and green box) that were to be monitored but not subject to reduction commitments. Blue box support includes potentially trade-distorting subsidies that also involve constraints on production, while green box support is a category of payments viewed to be minimally distorting for production and trade. The quantification of the total AMS includes all product-specific and non-product-specific support, except when this is below five percent of the corresponding value of production, a threshold defined as de minimis support. The total AMS plus the de minimis is referred to as amber box support.
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Agriculture has continued to occupy a central position in the Doha negotiations.
These focus on the three pillars of the UR AoA: domestic support, market access (tariffs and TRQs) and export competition (export subsidies). The AoA is 28 pages long. The summary of the draft modalities prepared by the chair of the WTO agricultural negotiating committee in December 2008 is over four times as long (123 pages).
Although commitments in individual country schedules would have to be included in considering the respective lengths of the two agreements, the substantial increase in length of the body of the draft Doha agreement is indicative of the complexity of the new modalities. (2) calculated on the basis of an average for 1995-2000, to be reduced according to the following: 80 percent for base OTDS levels greater than US$60 billion; 70 percent for base OTDS levels between US$10 and 60 billion; and 55 percent for base OTDS levels less than US$10 billion. B. Total AMS commitment to be reduced according to the following: 70 percent for final bound UR AoA levels of greater than US$40 billion; 60 percent for levels between US$ 15 and 40 billion; and 45 percent for levels less than US$ 15 billion. Furthermore, developed country Members with high relative levels of final bound total AMS (i.e., at least 40 percent of the average total value of agricultural production during [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] that are in the bottom tier, (i.e., less than US$ 15 billion) are required to make an additional reduction of one half of the difference between the reduction rates specified for the top two tiers (i.e., ½ [60 -45] or 7.5 percent). C. Product-specific AMS limits AMS support on a product-specific basis will have a base rate calculated as the average for 1995-2000. In cases where a Member introduced product-specific AMS exceeding the de minimis level, but where the country did not have product-specific AMS support during the base period, the limit may be the average value for the two years prior to the adoption of the modalities. In cases where product-specific support for each year during the base period was below the de minimus, the base is the de minimis level.
D. De minimis
The de minimis levels, either 5 percent of the total value of agricultural production for non-product-specific support or 5 percent of the total value of production of a basic agricultural product in the case of product-specific support, are to be reduced by no less than 50 percent. In-quota tariffs are to be reduced either by 50 percent or to a threshold of 10 percent, whichever is lower. In cases where the TRQ was administered by the MFN bound rate, the Member can eliminate the tariff quota. There is to be stricter administration of TRQ fill rates. Members have the right to request that unused import licenses be reallocated to potential users in cases where the quota is not filled.
3. Export subsidies are to be eliminated.
______________________________________________________________________________________
(1) Special provisions apply to the calculation of product-specific blue box limits for the United States and there are some provisions for shifting product-specific support from the AMS to the blue box (see Blandford et al. 2008 ). These are not included in the table.
(2) There is an additional reduction for developed countries with an OTDS exceeding 40% of the value of production.
Sources: WTO (2008b) , for domestic support, see also Orden (2008) 
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How Norway has adapted to the Uruguay Round
As a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations, Norway established a base (1986) (1987) (1988) average) for its total AMS of NOK 14.3 billion. This was reduced by 20 percent to NOK 11.4 billion over the implementation period, 1995-2000.
Norway's AMS is composed primarily of market price support, which is measured as the difference between domestic administrative prices and a fixed reference price, multiplied by eligible production. A binding reduction in the AMS would therefore translate into a reduction in administrative prices or eligible production or both. 
Green box support
Support that has no or minimal production and trade-distorting effects can, according to Annex 2 of the AoA, be placed in the green box category. This type of support must be provided through a publicly-funded government program not involving transfers from consumers, and cannot have the effect of providing price support to producers (Blandford and Josling 2007) . There are no ceilings or reduction commitments on the value of support under the green box. The largest item notified by Norway under the category is the "vacation and replacement scheme", which provides refunds for farm-related expenses when a farmer takes a vacation. This form of support is not explicitly mentioned in Annex 2, but it is quite substantial, accounting for roughly one third of Norway's green box total. Since, in reality, the scheme can have an effect equivalent to a farm labor subsidy, it could be argued that it stimulates production. In addition, payments made under the scheme are based either on the number of animals or the acreage in production, which appears to be inconsistent with the production-neutral requirement of green box support. Member countries could challenge Norway's inclusion of this program in the green box, requiring that it be notified under the AMS instead.
Another potentially controversial green box measure is the grain price-support program, which according to the government includes two items. The main item is a payment for stockholding for food security purposes, which is notified to the WTO under the "public stockholding for food security purposes" heading. The payment is given to processing industries that use Norwegian grain. It is paid on a per kilogram basis, and, in effect, reduces the price to domestic grain users. According to the WTO, an important criterion for payments under the "public stockholding for food security purposes" is:
"Expenditures (or revenue foregone) in relation to the accumulation and holding of stocks of products which form an integral part of a food security programme identified in national legislation. This may include government aid to private storage of products as part of such a programme.
. . Food purchases by the government shall be made at current market prices and sales from food security stocks shall be made at no less than the current domestic market price for the product and quality in question" (GATT 1994, p. 58) .
The current Norwegian system does not satisfy this condition and its inclusion in the green box is also potentially subject to challenge.
Blue box support
Schemes classified under the blue box fall under three types: (1) payments based on fixed area and yields; (2) payments made on 85 percent or less of the base level of production;
and (3) livestock payments made on a fixed number of head. As with green box programs there was no WTO commitment on the total value of blue box support in the AoA.
From Figure 1 (b) it may be seen that the share of the blue box support in total
Norwegian support is large, amounting to some 25 percent. Together with the amber box (AMS), these two categories constitute roughly two-thirds of overall domestic support.
Norway's most prominent blue box measure has been the "acreage and cultural landscape scheme", a fixed area support payment. But "headage support", a per unit livestock payment, is almost as high. is the sum of the current AMS ceiling, the average blue box value during 1995-2000, and the de minimis support, which is five percent of the value of agricultural production.
Since Norway has a total AMS less than US$ 15 billion, its AMS reduction commitment is 45 percent. However, countries such as Norway that have a high AMS as a share of total value of production face an additional 7.5 percent reduction. This 52.5 percent requirement means that Norway's total AMS binding has to be reduced from NOK 11.4 billion to NOK 5.4 billion. In addition, Norway currently has more than 40 percent of its trade distorting support under blue box measures, which requires the same reduction commitment as the total AMS. This would reduce the maximum value of blue box support from NOK 7.5 billion to NOK 3.6 billion. Norway would be required to reduce its OTDS by 55 percent, because the OTDS base is less than US$10 billion, resulting in a commitment of NOK 9.5 billion. , MLSI 2005 and MAF 2005 . For a farmer to be eligible for support an environmental plan must be followed and land must be managed in an environmentally friendly manner. The farmer receives a per hectare payment for compliance. There is additional support to help cover the cost of implementing certain types of production techniques, provided on an activity-specific basis. The national regulatory body, the Norwegian Agricultural Authority, has claimed that this support complies with green box criteria.
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In 2007, another change was introduced by the Norwegian Agricultural Authority whereby the support to grazing livestock, which earlier was considered part of "headage 5 This can be questioned because the green box compliance criteria state that such payments can only compensate for additional costs or income foregone through complying with an environmental program.
13 support" under the blue box, was included in the National Environmental Programme and was claimed to be green box (MAF 2006) . Because the support was labeled as a component of an environmental program, it was re-classified even though the nature of the payment had not changed. Hence, NOK 3 billion of the NOK 7.5 billion blue box support has already been shifted into the green box, which should make it easier for
Norwegian policymakers to meet a Doha cap of NOK 3.6 billion under the blue box.
Following the Japanese example
In 1997, Japan reduced its notified AMS substantially by changing its rice policy.
Administered prices for rice were eliminated, although the government continued to acquire rice for food security stocks (Godo and Takahashi 
An Assessment of the Implications of the Doha Modalities for Norway
The reduction commitments under any of the three pillars in the Doha modalities could potentially affect Norwegian agricultural policies. For example, consider the effect of eliminating export subsidies for cheese. The inability to provide such subsidies would curtail cheese exports, which are a convenient avenue for removing surplus milk from the domestic market. Hence, the elimination of export subsidies seems to imply a cut in the price of milk in order to reduce production. This would reduce the market price support component in the AMS. Lower milk production could also reduce income support under blue box support programs.
Similarly, reductions in tariffs and increases in the market access quotas under
TRQs across various product lines should lead to lower domestic prices through increased competition from imports. Therefore, increased market access should result in reductions in measured domestic support. A key issue is the extent to which the export competition and market access modalities would actually reduce measured support and, by extension, how much additional effort Norway might have to make to meet the Doha domestic support bindings summarized in Table 2 .
The model
To examine these issues we use a price-endogenous model of Norwegian agriculture. The amounted to 93 percent of the ceiling set in the UR AoA.
Doha assumptions and implementation
The main features of the proposed modalities under the most recent draft agreement are summarized in Table 1 . To consider the implications for Norway, the relevant modalities are considered and the assumptions used are given in Table 3 . The final bound AMS as well as the average blue box support in the base period 1995-2000 has to be reduced by 52.5 percent, while the maximum OTDS is to be reduced by 55 percent. Compared to the levels in the base year, which differ from the base rates, AMS, blue box support and OTDS have to be reduced by 49, 51.4 and 48.6 percent, respectively.
With respect to market access, MFN tariffs for products in the top tier that are not defined as sensitive are subject to a 70 percent reduction, with a 100 percent ceiling. For the principle Norwegian products, the 100 percent ceiling will be binding. However, as is pointed out below, since all principle Norwegian products can be defined as sensitive, the 100 percent ceiling will not be relevant. 
Market Access
A. MFN bound tariff rates: average 70 percent reduction for the highest tariff lines and there is a 100 percent tariff ceiling for all non-sensitive goods. B. Sensitive products: the maximum number of tariff lines that qualify as sensitive products under agriculture is 6 percent (4 plus an extra 2 percent in cases where a Member has more than 30 percent of their tariff lines in the top tariff band) based on the total number of HS-6 tariffs lines under agriculture (WTO definition of agriculture). C. MFN tariffs for sensitive products: MFN bound rates reduced by 23.33 percent (a 2/3 deviation from the otherwise 70 percent reduction). D. TRQ expansion: the market access quota is 6.5 -7 percent of domestic consumption (6 plus an extra 0.5 percent because all sensitive products have tariff rates exceeding 100 percent. For the additional 2 percent of sensitive products from B, TRQs are expanded by an extra 0.5 percent. This means that the TRQs are 6.5 percent of domestic consumption for the first 4 percent of the sensitive products, and 7 percent for the next 2 percent.) E. TRQ fill rate: a minimum fill rate of 65 percent to avoid being challenged by other WTO members.
Export subsidies are eliminated. _______________________________________________________________________
Sources: WTO (2008b); Gaasland, Garcia and Vårdal (2008) Products defined as sensitive are subject to lower tariff reductions, but at the expense of creating new market access opportunities through TRQs, which are additional to the existing TRQs from the UR. We assume that Norway will choose to define 6 percent of the total number of products listed under the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System of the tariff nomenclature (HS) at the 6-digit level as sensitive. This means that all principle Norwegian products such as grain, meat and milk products, are covered as sensitive products (see Appendix 4).
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The ordinary tariffs for sensitive products are subject to a 23.33 percent reduction in the MFN tariff rate (i.e. 2/3 deviation from the otherwise 70 percent reduction), which yields tariffs above 100 percent. Concessions in the form of new TRQs amount to 6.5 percent of domestic consumption, but with an additional 0.5 percent for the additional 2 percent of the product lines declared as sensitive products. The quota fill rate is set to 65 percent, below which challenges can be made by other WTO members. We assume that the authorities only hand out import quotas equal to this minimum fill rate. This will help promote price and market stability, which has been a hallmark of Norwegian agricultural policy. Finally, export subsidies are abolished. The details behind these calculations are shown in Appendix 4.
Results
The first column in Table 4 shows that domestic support in the base year 2003 was far above the new ceilings generated by the reduction commitments in Table 3 . The current AMS exceeds the new ceilings by 96 percent, blue support by 109 percent, and the OTDS by 90 percent. The first strategy to minimize the impact on agricultural activity, which Norway already has followed, is to transfer subsidies from blue to green categories. In 2005, two years after the base year of our analysis, roughly NOK 3 billion previously included in the "acreage and cultural landscape scheme" under the blue box was shifted to the green box without any major change in how the policy was implemented. The second column in Table 4 reflects this move. While production value and economic welfare are unchanged, blue box support and the OTDS decrease substantially, with blue box support now only 26 percent above the ceiling.
The next question is whether compliance with market access reduction commitments and the elimination of the export subsidy, as reported in Table 3 , will be sufficient to bring support levels below the ceilings. The effects of eliminating export subsidies are shown in column 3 of Table 4 . The present practice of subsidizing exports of cheese by levies on domestic sales of liquid milk is abolished. The implication is lower milk production which is accomplished by a cut in the farm gate price of milk. Since that price, interpreted as an administered price, enters into the market price support component of the total AMS, it and the OTDS are reduced (12 percent and 9 percent, respectively). Lower milk production and farm gate prices lead to a 6 percent decline in the total value of agricultural production. However, the 5 percent increase in economic welfare is indicative of the economic cost of the current policy regime.
If we now implement the market access commitments specified in Table 3 , we generate the results in the fourth column of Table 4 . While blue box support is close to the ceiling, the total AMS and the OTDS still exceed commitments by 23-39 percent. In other words, even if Norway complies with the market access and export subsidy commitments, the total AMS and the OTDS will still be too high. Also, observe that the production value in agriculture is now 25 percent below the present level which suggests that further cut in AMS and OTDS to comply with the commitments would have a major impact on Norwegian agriculture. To minimize the effects, an obvious strategy would be to abolish the administered prices, which, as explained in section 3.4, will remove market price support as defined by the UR AoA from the AMS calculation. 9 Since 98 percent of Norway's AMS is market price support, this provides substantial flexibility to compensate with deficiency payments within the NOK 5.4 billion AMS ceiling specified in Table 2 . The results in column 5 show that it is possible to maintain more than 90 percent of the production value while meeting WTO commitments with safe margins.
We can conclude that even through the proposed Doha commitments seem to allow Norway to maintain most of its current agricultural activity level, the framing of agricultural policy will have to change. The present system of domestic market regulation will be put under pressure when administered prices and export subsidies are eliminated and import options increase. Furthermore, cuts in import tariffs and higher TRQs imply lower farm gate prices, and, consequently, lower market price support. It follows that relatively more of the support has to be provided by taxpayers. Table 5 shows that budgetary support increases, in absolute terms, by nearly NOK 3 billion, while market price support is more than halved. As a result total support is only NOK 2 billion below the base year level. 
Conclusions
A major achievement of the Uruguay Round was to include agriculture in the WTO system of multilateral trade rules. However, the agreement has had only a modest effect on Norway's agricultural production and trade. The agreed constraint on amber box support has not affected Norwegian agricultural programs. Norway has, in fact, managed to expand agricultural output relative to the 1986-1988 base period, and the current total AMS and total support have remained stable during 1995-2004. The most that can be concluded is that there has been some reduction in the "water" in the inflated binding on the total AMS.
The question raised in this paper is whether a positive outcome in the on-going Doha Round will require real policy change. At first sight, the Doha draft modalities appear to be a considerable advance on the weak disciplines in the UR AoA. Norway's current AMS, blue box and OTDS exceed the proposed Doha ceilings by 90 -110 percent, and either elimination of export subsidies or the required increase in market access are sufficient to bring support levels below the ceilings.
However, it is likely that Norway, like many other countries, will try to reduce the current AMS and blue box support in ways that involve no major change in policy. First, Norway has already shifted roughly NOK 3 billion from blue box to green box with only modest changes in the requirements for receiving such support. Second, the market price component of AMS is being reduced for some products by simply changing the way administered prices are calculated or replacing these with reference prices, which are not covered in the AoA. This provides substantial flexibility to compensate producers through deficiency payments within the AMS ceiling.
By using such approaches our empirical analysis suggests that Norway will be able to maintain most of the current activity in agriculture. However, the framing of agricultural policy will have to change. The present system of domestic market regulation will be put under pressure when export subsidies are eliminated and market access improves. Most important, cuts in import tariffs and expanded TRQ volumes imply lower farm gate prices, and, consequently, lower market price support. Relatively more of the support will have to be provided by taxpayers, and to sustain current agricultural activity budgetary support will have to increase substantially compared to the current level. Such a shift in the use of policy instruments involves serious challenges for Norwegian policymakers since budget support is more transparent than market price support and hence exposed to public scrutiny. Norway's policies may also be more exposed internationally if WTO-member countries begin to look more closely at Norwegian notifications and question whether its "green-box" support programs actually meet WTO rules. For example, the AMS-limit will be exceeded if Norway is forced to notify the "acreage and cultural landscape scheme" and "headage support" as AMS-support.
In conclusion, on the basis of our analysis it is difficult to envisage that any fundamental reform in Norwegian agricultural policy will result from the implementation of the Doha Round modalities as currently drafted. Unless Norway decides to implement reform unilaterally, pressure for any real policy change through WTO disciplines will to have to wait for a future round of trade talks. paribus, production will first take place in the best regions. Domestic demand for final products is represented by linear demand functions. The economic surplus (i.e., consumer plus producer surplus) of the agricultural sector is maximized, subject to demand and supply relationships, policy instruments and imposed restrictions. The solution to the model is the set of prices and quantities that result in an equilibrium in each market.
10 More details and further references can be found in Mittenzwei and Gaasland (2008 
